Abstract. -We propose a consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game. In our model, both of the two connected agents receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost. Agents update their opinions by comparing payo?s with neighbors. The opinion of an agent with higher payoff is more likely to be imitated. We apply this model in scalefree networks with tunable degree distribution. Interestingly, we find that there exists an optimal ratio of cost to benefit, leading to the shortest consensus time. Qualitative analysis is obtained by examining the evolution of the opinion clusters. Moreover, we find that the consensus time decreases as the average degree of the network increases, but increases with the noise introduced to permit irrational choices. The dependence of the consensus time on the network size is found to be a power-law form. For small or larger ratio of cost to benefit, the consensus time decreases as the degree exponent increases. However, for moderate ratio of cost to benefit, the consensus time increases with the degree exponent. Our results may provide new insights into opinion dynamics driven by the evolutionary game theory.
Introduction. -The dynamics of opinion sharing and competing and the emergence of consensus have become an active topic of recent research in statistical and nonlinear physics [1] . One of the most successful methodologies used in opinion dynamics is agent-based modeling. The idea is to construct the computational devices (known as agents with some properties) and then simulate them in parallel to model the real phenomena. In physics this technique can be traced back to Monte Carlo simulations. A number of agent-based models have been proposed, which include the voter model [2] , the majority rule-model [3, 4] , the bounded-confidence model [5] and the social impact model [6] . Some models display a disorderorder transition [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , from a regime in which opinions are arbitrarily diverse to one in which most individuals hold the same opinion. Other models focus the emergence of a global consensus [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , in which all agents finally share the same opinion.
In this Letter, we propose an opinion model based on the evolutionary game. Evolutionary game theory as a powerful mathematical framework, has been widely used to understand cooperative behavior [19, 20] , traffic flow [21, 22] , epidemic spreading [23, 24] and so on. However, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of evolutionary games on the (a) E-mail: hxyang01@gmail.com formation of public opinion has received little attention.
In fact, it is natural for us to consider different opinions as different strategies. Individuals with different opinions compete with each other and gain the corresponding payoffs. We assume that both of the two connected individuals receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost. The above assumption has been demonstrated by many psychological experiments in which dissent often leads to punishment either psychologically or financially, or both, as human individuals attempt to attain social conformity [25, 26] .
In previous models, an individual usually follows the opinion of a randomly chosen neighbor [2] or the majority opinion in the neighborhood [3, 4] . However, in our model an individual updates its opinion by comparing payoffs with a randomly selected neighbors. The more payoff of the chosen neighbor has, with the higher probability of its opinion will be imitated. Interestingly, we find that there exists an optimal ratio of cost to benefit, leading to the shortest consensus time.
Model. -Our model is described as follows. For a given network of any topology, each node represents an agent. Initially the two opinions denoted by the values ±1 are randomly assigned to agents with equal probability. Both of the two connected agents receive a benefit b if they have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost c. Thus, the total payoff of agent x can be calculated as
where k x is the degree of agent x, S x is the opinion of agent x, and the sum runs over the nearest-neighbor set Ω x of agent x. Agents asynchronously update their opinions in a random sequential order. At each time step, we randomly select an agent x who obtains the payoff P x according to Eq. (1). Then we choose one of agent x's nearest neighbors at random, and the chosen agent y also acquires its payoff P y by the same rule. We suppose that the probability that agent x adopts agent y's opinion is given by the Fermi function [27] [28] [29] [30] :
where κ characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational choices.
In the Fermi updating rule, the opinion of an agent with higher payoff is more likely to be imitated. For P y > P x (P y < P x ), the probability that agent x adopts agent y's opinion is larger (smaller) than 0.5.
Results. -In all following simulations, we use the Barabási-Albert scale-free networks [31] to study opinion dynamics with the evolutionary game rules. Each data point is based on 100 realizations of the network and 10 realizations on each network. To simplify, we set the benefit from the common opinion as b = 1. We define the consensus time T c as the time steps required to reach the global consensus where all agents in a network share the same opinion. Figure 1 shows that T c as a function of the cost c for different values of the average degree of the network k , the network size N and the noise κ. From Fig. 1 , one can see that for given values of other parameters, there exists an optimal value of c, hereafter denoted by c opt , resulting in the shortest consensus time T c .
The value of c opt changes with the average degree of the network k , the network size N and the noise κ. For given p-2 Fig. 2 , one can also observe that the value of c opt is more than the benefit which is previously set to be 1.
Initially, the two competing opinions are randomly distributed among the population with the equal probability. Thus, according to the mean-field theory, the initial payoff of agent x can be approximatively expressed as P x (0) = (b − c)k x /2. For b > c, the initial payoff of agent x increases with its degree. However, for b < c, P x (0) decreases as the agent's degree increases.
In scale-free networks a few nodes have high degrees (usually are called as hubs), while most nodes are of low degrees. It has been shown that the opinion dynamics is proceeded by formation of some large opinion clusters centered at hubs [32] [33] [34] [35] . A opinion cluster is a connected component (subgraph) fully occupied by nodes holding the same opinion. Through the competition of different opinion clusters, one cluster will invade the others and finally dominate the system with a global consensus. For very large values of the cost c, initially the payoffs of high-degree agents are much lower than that of low-degree agents and the opinions of hubs have a very small probability to be imitated. Thus it becomes difficult for agents to form large opinion clusters centered at hubs. On the other hand, for very small values of c, a hub has so strong influence on its low-degree neighbors that the cluster formed by this hub is extremely stable. As a result, the merging of different clusters become very difficult for too large c, leading to a longer consensus time. Taken together, we can expect that the shortest consensus time would be realized at the moderate value of c.
To verify the above analysis, we study the number of opinion clusters N cl as the rescaled time t/N evolves for different values of the cost c. From Fig. 3 , one can see that initially there exist hundreds of opinion clusters in the network but N cl eventually decreases to 1 as the time evolves. For c = 5, initially N cl decreases much more slowly, compared with c = 0.1 and 1.2, indicating that it is hard to form big opinion clusters when c is large. For c = 0.1, N cl decreases faster than the cases of c = 1.2 and c = 5 in the early stage (t/N < 100). However, when only a few clusters remain in the system, for example, N cl < 40, N cl decreases very slowly for c = 0.1, indicating that the competition among big opinion clusters becomes furious when c is too small.
Finally, we investigate the effects of the average degree of the network k , the network size N and the noise κ on the consensus time. From Fig. 4(a) , we see that for a given value of the cost c, the consensus time T c decreases as k increases. The consensus time T c scales as N β with the exponent β depending on the value of c [see Fig. 4(b) ]. The exponent β =1.19, 1.13, 1.15, correspond to c = 0.2, 1.2, 3 respectively. In particular, the optimal c = 1.2 results in the lowest value of β. From Fig. 4(c) , we also observe that the consensus time T c increases as the noise κ increases. This phenomenon indicates that the more rational choice (following the opinion of the agent with higher payoff) will accelerate the formation of consensus.
Conclusions and discussions. -In conclusion, we have proposed an opinion model based on the evolutionary game. An agent receives a benefit if it has the same opinion with a neighbor, otherwise it pays a cost. An agent randomly selects a neighbors as a reference. The agent has a higher (lower) probability to imitate the opinion of the chosen neighbor if its payoff is lower (larger) than that of the selected neighbor. The results in scale-free networks show that, the shortest consensus time can be obtained when the cost of conflicting opinions is a litter larger than the benefit of common opinions. For very high ratio of cost to benefit, initially hubs have so low payoffs that their opinions are seldom imitated, which prevents the formation of large opinion clusters. On the other hand, too low ratio of cost to benefit makes the merging of different clusters become very difficult. Thus the shortest consensus time must be realized at the moderate ratio of cost to benefit.
The interplay between the opinion dynamics and the evolutionary games is a very interesting topic. Previous studies have shown that the introduction of opinion dynamics can greatly affect the evolution of cooperation [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] . For example, Szolnoki and Perc discovered that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range [36] . Yang et. found that cooperation is promoted by punishing neighbors with the opposite strategy [37] . Together previous and our works offer an un- 
